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Abstract 
This study aims to analyze the factors that affect budgetary slack which include 
employee motivation and asymmetric information with participative budgeting as 
the antecedent variables. The research method was conducted through a survey 
method by distributing questionnaires to 229 heads of responsibility center on 
SOEs in Bandung. In addition, interviews and group discussions were conducted to 
improve data collection. The data obtained were analyzed using the structural 
equation model - LISREL. The results showed that asymmetric information has a 
positive effect on budgetary slack and employee motivation has a negative effect 
on budgetary slack. Meanwhile, participative budgeting has a positive effect on 
asymmetric information and employee motivation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Budget has an important role in an organization. This role is reflected at the 
function of the budget which is as a planning and control tool for a company 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007). Thus, the budget estimates planning process is a 
determinant of organizational success. Another important function of budget is to 
assess the performance of business units or individuals. Therefore, budget has a 
significant effect towards employee behavior (Weygandt et al., 2015). In order to 
obtain a good performance appraisal, employees strive to create "breathing space" 
in budgeting by increasing the estimates of cost and reducing the estimates of 
income excessively (Horngren et al., 2015; Walther & Skousen, 2009). In addition, 
the "tradition" of cutting budgets at the time of proposing a budget often raises 
employee initiatives to overstate the budget (Samad, 2018, as a Chairman of 
Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC) for the period 2011-2015). Behavior of 
overstating the budget is known / termed as budgetary slack, which is an unethical 
behavior and leads to dysfunctional behavior (Goebel & WeiBenberger, 2016;  
Adnan & Ali, 2014). 
Problems which are related to budget dysfunctional behavior occur in various 
companies, especially at SOEs. The investigations conducted by the Indonesian 
Corruption Watch (ICW) found that corruption that had been occurring in Indonesia 
until 2017 was indicated through budgetary slacks (77 cases)  (Alamsyah, 2018, as 
a staff of the ICW Investigation Division).  Novo (2017) as the Expert Staff of the 
Minister of SOE added that corruption occurs most frequently when the project is 
run by marking up the budget.  Parmoredjo (2018) as the Accounting Assessment 
Officer of PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia stated that the existence of a policy for 
budget cuts indicated the initiative of cost center managers to conduct budgetary 
slack. The Head of the Attorney General's Legal Information Center, Rum (2017), 
stated that a similar problem also occurred at PT Pertamina Patra Niaga in which 
the budget submission by the company was allegedly marked up. A similar case 
was expressed by Pangarso (2018), as the Deputy Chairman of Commission VI of 
the Indonesian House of Representatives. He expressed his suspicion to PT 
Waskita Karya, which had not been transparent so far and was alleged to 
manipulate its budget. Syarif (2018), the Deputy Chairman of CEC, also had the 
same concern on PT Nindya Karya Persero that was suspected of conducting 
deviations and marking up the budget of the Sabang jetty construction project.  
Budgetary slack was affected by many factors. One of them is asymmetric 
information (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012). Asymmetric information occurs 
when subordinates hide the information so that superiors do not have sufficient 
information to measure the actual contributions made by subordinates (Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2007). One way that can be done to reduce asymmetric information 
is through participative budgeting (Drury, 2018).  Kren & Maiga (2015) stated that 
participative budgeting can reduce the level of asymmetric information. However, 
there are several studies that showed contradictory results, namely Basuki (2015), 
Cheng et al. (2014), Lavarda & Almeida (2013), and Douglas & Wier (2000) who 
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stated that companies with participative budgeting cannot minimize the occurrence 
of asymmetric information. 
Another factor affecting the budgetary slack is the employee motivation 
(Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman, 2015). The form of employee motivation is internal 
strength from each of the employees. If the internal strength is developed, it is 
possible for employees to pursue activities which are considered meaningful and 
interesting (Colquit et al., 2017). Activities that are considered meaningful and 
interesting are activities that are perceived as positive, which can reduce the 
potential for budgetary slack. One way to increase employee motivation is to invite 
them to participate in determining the budget estimating plan (Noreen et al., 2014). 
This is emphasized through the results of the research conducted by Dow et al. 
(2015),  Yee et al. (2016), and Djalil et al. (2017), who stated that participative 
budgeting affects employee motivation. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors that affect budgetary slack, 
consisting of employee motivation and asymmetric information with participative 
budgeting as the antecedent variables. This study presents the asymmetric 
information and employee motivation (focusing on intrinsic motivation) as the 
variables that together mediate the relationship between participative budgeting 
and budgetary slack. This is what differentiates this study from the previous 
studies. This study is expected to provide input in the form of policies for the 
government, especially for the Ministry of SOE in improving the governance and 
performance of SOE companies in terms of budgeting. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Budgetary Slack 
Theoretically, budgetary slack has been defined by many experts and 
researchers. Budgetary slack is considered as a "cushion" for managers or 
participants involved in the budget planning process. Budgetary slack occurs when 
the estimated amount of the income budget is too low and the cost budget is too 
high from their best estimates in the future (Ngo et al., 2017; Weygandt et al., 
2015; Faria & Silva, 2013). Furthermore, budgetary slack is designed to create a 
"breathing room" for budget planners (Walther & Skousen, 2009). Then, budgetary 
slack is also defined as a budget that will facilitate the achievement of targets 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007). 
Based on the studies done by researchers, the majority of research about 
budgetary slack uses many indicators from research conducted by Onsi (1973), 
Dunk (1993), and Van der Stede (2000). Yet, this study uses the indicators 
developed by Van der Stede (2000). This is because these indicators are the result 
of refinement of indicators developed by Onsi (1973) and Dunk (1993). In addition, 
the Van der Stede (2000) is an indicator that is in line with some of the demands of 
budgeting policies that occur in SOEs. One of them is listed in the "Company 
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Regulations of the Company (Persero) PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Tbk. 
PD.306.000 / r.01 / HK.230 / COP-A0010000 / 2013". 
2.2. Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information can be stated as a concept that occurs. It is also the 
most basic in theory involving two parties, namely superiors and subordinates 
(Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010). According to the agency theory, managers will use 
asymmetric information opportunistically so that it has an overall impact on 
information. 
Merchant & Van der Stede (2012) stated that asymmetrical information 
occurs when superiors have an incomplete knowledge about what could be 
achieved in certain areas. According to Chandra (2011), this condition occurs when 
the principal (manager) has insufficient information about the activities of the agent 
(subordinate), the principal cannot ensure the contribution given by an agent for 
the company's results. Asymmetric information occurs when an agent 
(subordinate) conceals information so that the principal (supervisor) does not have 
sufficient information to measure the actual contribution made by the agent 
(subordinate) for the company. 
Asymmetric information can be measured by using several indicators. In fact, 
the major studies related to asymmetric information had used indicators which 
were developed by Jaworski & Young (1992) and Dunk (1993) in their 
measurements. In this study, the indicators used are indicators developed by Dunk 
(1993). This is because this indicator is the one which is frequently used to 
measure asymmetric information. 
2.3. Employee Motivation 
Motivation is defined as a set of energetic forces that originate from within 
and from outside of employees, work-related business initiatives, and determine 
the direction, strength, and perseverance (Colquitt et al., 2017). Motivation is 
related to a series of processes that arouse, direct, and maintain behavior towards 
a goal (Greenberg, 2011). Furthermore, Newstrom (2015) explains that the working 
motivation is the result of a series of internal and external forces that cause 
employees to choose the right actions and engage in certain behaviors. 
In this study, employee motivation will be focused on intrinsic motivation or 
motivation that comes from within the employee. Intrinsic motivation in the theory 
of "self-determination" is known as autonomous motivation (Weibel et al., 2014), 
while extrinsic motivation is known as controlled motivation (Fall & Roussel, 2014: 
208). Baerdermaeker and Bruggeman (2015) conducted a study which was related 
to these two motivations that were associated with budgetary slack. The results of 
this study indicate that autonomous motivation is more capable to reduce the 
potential for budgetary slack compared to the use of controlled motivation. This is 
the basis for researchers to focus this research on the direction of intrinsic 
motivation. 
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Intrinsic motivation here refers to motivation control by individuals and based 
on experience from the activity itself (McShane & Glinow, 2018). Things that 
intrinsically motivate is the internal appreciation that a person feels when he/ she is 
working, so there is a close and direct relationship between work and appreciation. 
An employee in this situation is motivated by himself (Newstrom, 2015). 
Measurement of intrinsic motivation could be done using several indicators. 
Based on previous studies, there were two studies that developed indicators of 
measurement of intrinsic motivation conducted by Dermer (1975) and Warr et al. 
(1979). In this study, the indicators used are indicators developed by Warr et al. 
(1979). This is because these indicators are the result of refinement of indicators 
compiled by Dermer (1975) and many researchers have used these indicators to 
measure intrinsic motivation. This indicator according to Warr et al. (1979) has also 
been modified and linked to the budget by Dow et al. (2015). 
2.4. Participative Budgeting 
Participative budgeting is a bottom-up approach for budgeting. Furthermore, 
Shim et al. (2012) explained that participative budgeting is a budgeting system that 
involves all employees in the process of preparing the organization's budget. Top 
management can start the budget process with general budgetary guidelines, but it 
is the lower-level units that encourage budget development in their units (Walther & 
Skousen, 2009). Hansen et al. (2009) added that participative budgeting 
communicates a sense of responsibility and fosters creativity for lower-level 
managers. 
Based on previous studies, participative budgeting can be measured by 
several indicators and the majority is using the indicators developed by Milani 
(1975), Merchant (1981), and Barki and Hartwick (1994). The participative 
budgeting indicator used is an indicator developed by Milani (1975). 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Asymmetric Information and Budgetary Slack 
Budgetary slack is about the difference between the projected income and 
costs provided by managers with realistic estimates that are actually able to be 
achieved (Shim et al., 2012). A budgetary slack occurs when the budget revenue 
target is made lower than the actual potential revenue (Kridawan & Mahmud, 
2014). Slack can occur if there is asymmetric information (Dunk & Nouri, 1998). 
The higher the level of asymmetric information refers to the higher the chance of 
conducting budgetary slack (Fanani & Saudale, 2018).  Asymmetric information 
can be interpreted as concepts that occur in the agency theory. Asymmetric 
information occurs when an agent (subordinate) conceals the information so that 
the principal (supervisor) does not have any sufficient information to measure the 
actual contribution made by the agent (subordinate) to the company (Macintosh & 
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Quattrone, 2010). Previous studies also have the same concern by agreeing that 
asymmetric information has a positive effect towards budgetary slack (Ngo et al., 
2017; Kren & Maiga, 2015; Faria & Silva, 2013; Aprila & Hidayani, 2012; 
Damrongsukniwat et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2002; Dunk, 1993). 
H1: Asymmetric information has a positive effect on budgetary slack 
 
3.2. Participative Budgeting and Asymmetric Information 
One way that could be done to reduce asymmetric information is by using 
participative budgeting (Zonatto & Lavarda, 2013). Participative budgeting can be 
interpreted as a budget preparation process, involving subordinates (Brink et al., 
2018). This process begins with the presentation of general budget guidelines by 
top management and continues with the formulation of budget targets by managers 
who act as budget users (Noreen et al., 2014). According to Anthony & 
Govindarajan (2007) participative budgeting can result in effective exchange of 
information and budget users could have a clearer understanding of their work 
through the interactions with superiors during the review and approval phases. The 
results of previous studies conducted by Kren & Maiga (2015) found an empirical 
finding that participative budgeting could reduce the level of asymmetric 
information. 
H2: Participative Budgeting has a negative effect towards asymmetric 
information 
 
3.3. Employee Motivation and Budgetary Slack 
Besides asymmetric information, another factor that could affect budgetary 
slack is the employee motivation (Baerdemaeker & Bruggeman, 2015). Employee 
motivation in this study is more focused on intrinsic motivation, which is a desire 
that comes from within the employee to complete the job. These factors, namely 
pleasure, attraction, and feeling challenged to work positively without relying on 
external factors (McShane & Glinow, 2018; Colquitt et al., 2017). Kinicki & Fugate 
(2016) added that their research showed that intrinsic motivation is more durable 
and has a more positive impact on performance than extrinsic motivation. In other 
words, intrinsic motivation has a negative effect on budget slack. As in the theory 
of "self-determination", intrinsic motivation is known as autonomous motivation 
(Weibel et al., 2014). Moreover, Baerdermaeker & Bruggeman (2015) have shown 
in their research that autonomous motivation is more capable to reduce the 
potential for slack the budget, compared to the use of controlled motivation 
(extrinsic motivation). 
H3: Employee Motivation has a negative effect towards Budgetary Slack 
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3.4. Participative Budgeting  and Employee Motivation 
When employees are included in the budgeting planning process, their 
motivation will increase (Dow et al., 2015). The increased motivation the 
employees in achieving budget targets occurs because those employees who are 
invited to participate in the budget planning process have accepted these targets 
(Zimmerman, 2014; Shim, et al., 2012). There are many previous studies that 
analyze the effect of participative budgeting towards employee motivation. The 
results of these studies indicate that participative budgeting has a positive effect on 
employee motivation (Djalil et al., 2017; Yee et al., 2016; Dow et al., 2015). 
H4: Participative Budgeting has a positive effect towards Employee 
Motivation 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This study used descriptive survey research design, with questionnaire, 
interviews and group discussions as data collection techniques. The questionnaire 
of this study was distributed via postal (mail survey), online survey and direct 
survey. In this study, the researchers included open- ended questions which are 
related to the research variables. It makes the researchers could explore several of 
other factors that might affect budgetary slack. 
The population in this study was the heads of the responsibility center of SOE 
companies in Bandung, in a total of 27 companies. It is assumed that each SOE 
which became the population target had 50 heads of responsibility center. Thus, 
the respondents of this study were 1,350. The numbers of samples based on the 
population were determined based on the complexity of the model and the basic 
characteristics of the measurement model. According to Hair et al. (2014: 574), 
when the model contains five variables or less and in each variable, there are more 
than three measurable variables, it means that the minimum number of samples is 
100. With this basis, the minimum sample that must be fulfilled is 100 respondents. 
Respondents of this study were managers or heads of responsibilities 
centers. In terms of its relation to variable measurement, researchers measured 
the participative budgeting variables from the indicators which were adopted from 
Milani's study (1975). This is because the indicator developed by Milani (1975) is 
the most used indicator to measure participative budgeting. Then, asymmetric 
information variables were measured using indicators developed by Dunk (1993). 
This is because it is the most used indicator to measure asymmetric information. 
Meanwhile, employee motivation variables were measured using the indicators 
developed by Warr et al. (1979) that have been modified and linked to the budget 
by Dow et al. (2015) and have been widely used in previous studies. Meanwhile, 
budgetary slack variables were measured by indicators developed by Van der 
Stede (2000). This is because these indicators are the result of improvement from 
the indicators developed by Onsi (1973) and Dunk (1993). The indicators used 
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were measured on a Likert scale (1-5). The data analysis technique used in this 
study was the LISREL structural equation model (SEM). 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
Notes: SA = Budgetary Slack; IA = Asymmetric Information; M = Motivation; BP = 
Participative Budgeting 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Data Normality Testing 
The data normality testing in the study were measured using the Lisrel 8.8 
software with 229 samples collected. Based on the sample data, the results 
showed that the data did not meet the values of the multivariate normality 
assumption, so bootstrap data was conducted for approximately 1.5 times from the 
initial sample value. After bootstrapping the data, the number of samples became 
350 data and the results of normality testing met the value of multivariate normality 
assumption (p-value of skewness and kurtosis is 0.87> 0.05). Thus, the parameter 
estimation using Maximum Likelihood and data processing can be preceded to the 
next stage. 
 
5.2. Validity and Reliability of the Measurement Model Testing 
The tests was conducted by noticing at the value of standardized loading 
factor, construct reliability, and extracted variance in which the results are shown in 
the following table: 
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Table 1. Validity and Reliability of the Measurement Model Testing 
Variables 
standardized 
loading factor 
≥ 0,50 
Errors 
Reliabilities 
Notes CR≥0,70 VE≥0,50 
SA   0.86 0.56 Good Reliability 
SA1 0.53 0.72   Good Validity 
SA2 0.86 0.26   Good Validity 
SA3 0.82 0.32   Good Validity 
SA4 0.84 0.29   Good Validity 
SA5 0.61 0.63   Good Validity 
IA   0.87 0.59 Good Reliability 
IA1 0.55 0.70   Good Validity 
IA2 0.55 0.70   Good Validity 
IA3 0.77 0.41   Good Validity 
IA5 0.91 0.17   Good Validity 
IA6 0.96 0.08   Good Validity 
M   0.86 0.55 Good Reliability 
M1 0.71 0.50   Good Validity 
M3 0.63 0.61   Good Validity 
M4 0.73 0.47   Good Validity 
M5 0.80 0.36   Good Validity 
M6 0.84 0.29   Good Validity 
BP   0.81 0.60 Good Reliability 
BP1 0.63 0.61   Good Validity 
BP3 0.82 0.33   Good Validity 
BP6 0.85 0.27   Good Validity 
      Sources: processed by researchers 
     
Based on the above results, it can be seen that the IA4, M2, BP2, BP4, and 
BP5 indicators have been removed because they are invalid. 
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5.3. Goodness of Fit Testing 
The test results of the goodness of fit are shown in the following table 4 using 
the criteria stated by Riadi (2018: 113-115) and Wijanto (2008: 61-62).  
Table 2. Goodness of Fit Test 
GOF size Estimation 
Result 
Criteria Result 
RMSEA 0.06 RMSEA 0.05 
RMSEA  0.08 
Good Fit 
NFI 0.95 NFI 0.90 Good Fit 
TLI atau NNFI 0.97 TLI≥0.90 Good Fit 
CFI 0.97 CFI 0.97 Good Fit 
IFI 0.97 IFI 0.90 Good Fit 
RFI 0.94 RFI 0.90 Good Fit 
CN 206.58 CN > 200 Good Fit 
SRMR 0.06 SRMR  0.05 
0.05 < SRMR < 0.10 
Marginal Fit 
GFI 0.92 GFI  0.90 Good Fit 
AGFI 0.89 AGFI 0.90 
0.80 AGFI 0.90 
Marginal Fit 
     Sources: processed by researchers 
     
Based on the results above, the research model can be stated as "Fit" 
because the majority of the results indicated "Good Fit". 
 
5.4. Hypothesis Testing and Discussion 
Hypothesis testing is conducted using the Lisrel 8.8 software after the model 
is stated as fit and it is shown in table 5 below: 
 
Table 3. Hypothesis Test Results 
Hypothesis Path Path 
Coef. 
Error T-
Value 
R2 Results 
H1 (+) IA  SA 0.27 0.065 4.12 0.26 Accepted 
H2 (-) BP  IA 0.22 0.057 3.84 0.04
8 
Rejected 
H3 (-) M  SA -0.88 0.14 -6.19 0.26 Accepted 
H4 (+) BP  M 0.50 0.063 7.89 0.25 Accepted 
 Sources: processed by researchers 
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Figure 2. Structural Model Analysis (t-value) with Lisrel 8.8 
 
a. Asymmetric information has a positive effect on budgetary slack (H1) 
The coefficient of the effect of asymmetric information towards budgetary 
slack is 0.27 with an error value of 0.065, resulting in a t value of 4.12. Because the 
hypothesis stated a positive effect, then the right-direction test was conducted (t-
statistic> t-table = 4.12> 1.96). Based on these results, it can be concluded that the 
effect of asymmetric information towards budgetary slack is significant and the first 
hypothesis can be accepted. This condition shows that the high asymmetric 
information can cause a budgetary slack on SOE in Bandung. The major cause of 
the high asymmetric information is the complexity of the procedures in preparing, 
revising and implementing budget activities, which are often indicated to only 
complicated budgeters. One example of the complexity of the procedure that 
occurs in SOE in Bandung is the existence of a review process that is conducted 
several times and in each review it causes budget cuts. These difficulties often 
make the budgeting participants to mark-up / mark down the budget made in order 
to create a bumper in the implementation of the budget. This behavior creates a 
perception that marking-up / marking down is a common thing to do. This is in line 
with the results of research conducted by Ngo et al. (2017), Kren & Maiga (2015), 
Faria & Silva (2013), Aprila & Hidayani (2012), Damrongsukniwat et al. (2011), 
Fisher et al. (2002), and Dunk (1993) who acknowledge that asymmetric 
information has a positive effect towards the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
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b. Participative budgeting has a negative effect towards asymmetric 
information (H2) 
The coefficient of the effect of participative budgeting towards asymmetric 
information is 0.22 with an error value of 0.057, resulting in a t value of 3.84. As the 
hypothesis stated a negative effect, a left-direction test was conducted (t-statistic <-
t-table). The results showed that the t-statistic value is more than the negative t-
table value (3.84> -1.96). Thus, it can be concluded that the direct effect of 
participative budgeting towards asymmetric information is not significant and the 
second hypothesis cannot be accepted. On the results of respondents' 
observations and interviews, asymmetric information has encouraged SOEs in 
Bandung to make a policy that involves lower-level managers to participate in 
budgeting. Involving managers in budgeting is one of the form of participation that 
is expected to be able to create information related to the responsibilities of the 
lower-level managers to be extracted, shared and considered in budgeting. 
However, in reality, this policy does not make information exchange becomes more 
effective. This happens because the majority of respondents assume that 
budgeting participation is only a procedure that must be passed without 
considering the benefits of such involvement. This is also supported by the 
distribution of respondents' data showing that the majority of working ages in 
companies are more than 5 years. These respondents have the perception that the 
lower level managers are the most familiar with the technical work they do because 
they have had a working age of more than 5 years in the company. It is through 
this perception that lower-level managers use budgeting participation as a facility to 
negotiate in lowering budget targets. This finding is not in line with the results of 
Kren & Maiga's research (2015). However, it is in line with the results of research 
conducted by Basuki (2015), Cheng et al. (2014), Lavarda & Almeida (2013), and 
Douglas & Wier (2000) which stated that companies with participative budgeting 
are not able to minimize the occurrence of asymmetric information. 
c. Employee motivation has a negative effect on budgetary slack (H3) 
The coefficient of the effect of employee motivation towards budgetary slack 
is -0.88 with an error value of 0.14, resulting in a value of -6.19. Because the 
hypothesis stated a negative effect, the left-direction test was conducted (t-
statistics <-t-table = -6.19 <-1.96). Next, it can be concluded that the direct effect of 
employee motivation towards budgetary slack is significant and the third 
hypothesis can be accepted. The condition that occurs in SOE in Bandung 
indicates a high employee motivation. High motivation is created due to the basis 
of measuring the performance of individuals and responsibilities units of SOEs in 
Bandung based on achieving the results of working targets which have been 
agreed in the budget. In the end, the lower-level managers who are motivated to 
get a good appraisal indirectly will try to minimize the occurrence of budgetary 
slack. This finding is in line with the results of research conducted by 
Baedermaeker & Bruggeman (2015). 
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d. Participative budgeting has a positive effect towards employee 
motivation (H4) 
The coefficient of the effect of participative budgeting towards employee 
motivation is 0.50 with an error value of 0.063, resulting in a t value of 7.89. As the 
hypothesis showed a positive effect, the right-direction test was conducted (t-
statistic> t-table = 7.89> 1.96). It can be concluded that the direct effect of 
participative budgeting towards employee motivation is significant and the fourth 
hypothesis can be accepted. Participative budgeting has made lower-level 
managers in SOEs in Bandung become more motivated in carrying out their duties 
and responsibilities. With the invitation to participate, lower-level managers feel 
being valued and recognized for their existence. When an employee feels valued 
and recognized of his/her existence, then the desire of employees to actualize 
themselves increases. The same result is also found in research conducted by 
Djalil et al. (2017), Yee et al. (2016), and Dow et al. (2015). They affirm that 
participation in budgeting affects the employee motivation in acceptance and 
commitment for the budget goals. 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
Based on the results of data testing and discussion for each hypothesis, it 
can be concluded that: 
a. Asymmetric information has a positive effect towards budgetary slack, 
b. Participative budgeting has a positive effect towards asymmetric 
information, 
c. Employee motivation has a negative effect towards budgetary slack, 
d. Participative budgeting has a positive effect towards employee 
motivation. 
The suggestion that can be given by researchers to the Ministry of SOEs is 
that teamwork within SOEs needs to be built very carefully. The teamwork built 
does not only require professionalism at work, but there should be an intimacy and 
comfort created at work. Leaders should be able to position themselves both when 
to act decisively and when to embrace their employees. Thus, employees will not 
feel reluctant and will be more open in sharing information and difficulties 
encountered in the work, even become motivated to provide the best results in 
every job. The existence of periodic reports related to detailed field conditions and 
achieving daily targets is also important to be implemented within the company and 
known by the leaders. This will help to give leaders a better understanding of the 
conditions faced by employees, so asymmetric information and slack activities can 
be minimized. Meanwhile, training and refreshment of corporate's values and spirit 
becomes an important thing so that employees are more motivated to uphold the 
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corporate values and spirit. Increment of employee awareness of corporate values 
and spirit will make these employees achieve the company goals by minimizing 
slack activities. 
 The research was conducted only limited in SOEs in Bandung with a total 
sample of 229 respondents. By this limitation, it is expected that future researchers 
can develop more by expanding the area of research and collecting more samples, 
so that research results will be closer to the condition that occurs in the population. 
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